アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（９）共感は、喜びを活気づけ、悲しみを和らげる
Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other, no doubt, do in some measure. When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him, but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves, and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus enlivens our own. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1...