名著探究

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society [says he], whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments." – FEDERALIST 85, Conclusion: Alexander Hamilton （憲法を制定する前に、修正しようとする熱意は、次の堅実で等しく独創的な１人の作家の見解が正当であることに同意することが出来る人ならば誰でも弱まるに違いありません。「一般法に基づいて、君主制であれ共和制であれ、大きな国家や社会の平衡を保つことは至難の業（わざ）ですので、人間の才能が、どんなに包括的であっても、単なる理性と熟考によって、それを達成することは出来ません。多くの判断をその作業に結集し、経験によってその労苦を導き、時間を掛けてそれを完璧なものにし、不都合を感じなが...

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.– FEDERALIST 85, Conclusion: Alexander Hamilton （制定後に修正されるかもしれないことに反対して、国民政府の運営陣は常に、かつて保有していた権限の如何なる部分も手放したがらないと主張されてきました。私自身は、熟慮の結果、有用と思われる修正は、膨大な権限にではなく、政府組織に適用されるものであるということを、完全に確信しています。そして、この理由だけでも、今述べた所見は重要でないと思っています。別の理由からも、これは殆ど重要でないと思います）― フェデラリスト８５：結語：ハミルトン The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordin...

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city, are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.– FEDERALIST 85, Conclusion: Alexander Hamilton （最近この市で出版された優れた小冊子に挙げられた理由は、先の大会が会合し、審議し、結論を出した状況と、少しでも同じくらい好結果が期待できる状況下で、新しい大会を招集することなどまったく有り得ないことを示すのに反論の余地がありません。この論文自体は広く流布していると思われますので、そこで使い古された議論は繰り返しません。確かに、祖国のあらゆる支持者が熟読するに値するものです。しかしながら、修正案の問題には、まだ検討されておらず、まだ公開さ...

I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced. – FEDERALIST 85, Conclusion: Alexander Hamilton （私は、提案された制度を貴方方が採用するように勧める議論を全面的に信頼していますし、反対されてきた議論に真の効力を見付けることが出来ないことも隠しはしません。それが私達の政治状況、習慣、意見が認める最良のものなのであり、革命が生み出した如何なるものよりも優れていると私は納得しております）― フェデラリスト８５：結語：ハミルトン Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. – Ibid . （この計画を支持する側が、これは完全無欠を主張するものではないと譲歩したことは、敵対する人達に少な...

Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. -- FEDERALIST 85, Conclusion: Alexander Hamilton （このように、同胞の皆さん、私は自らに課した任務を遂行致しました。どれほど上手く行ったかに就（つ）きましては、皆さんの行動如何に掛かっています。少なくとも、私が努力する際の心持ちについて、皆さんにお約束したことに間違いはなかったと認めて頂...

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. -- FEDERALIST 10: The Same Subject Continued: by James Madison （共和政体を狭い範囲に限定する誤りは、これまでの論文で次々に明らかにされ、反論されてきました。私がここで指摘したいのは、この誤りは、主として共和国と民主主義を混同し、後者の性質から導き出される推論を前者に適用したために生じ、広まったと思われるということだけです。これらの形式の本当の区別については、前の機会にも言及しました。それは、民主主義国では、国民本人が直接集まって政治を行うのに対し、共和国では、代表者や代理人が集まり、政治を行うということです。その結果、民主主義国は狭い場所に限定されることになります。共和国は、広い地域...

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, -- is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives ...

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. -- FEDERALIST 10: The Same Subject Continued: by James Madison （次に、大国では、各代表が小共和国よりも多数の国民によって選ばれ、悪辣（あくらつ）な手管（てくだ）で選挙に勝ち、価値のない候補者が当選することが難しくなります。また、国民の投票がもっと自由になるため、最も魅力ある功績や、最も広がり易く名声が確立した性質を持つ人物により集中しそうです）― フェデラリスト１０：続き：ジェームズ・マディソン 　選挙区が小さければ、候補者と選挙民の距離が近く、買収などの選挙違反が蔓延（はびこ）るが、選挙区が大きければ、そのようなことはないというのがマディソンの主張であるが、これは正しくない。選挙区が大きくなれば、別の形で選挙民は誘導されるのであって、選挙区の大小だけでこういったことを言っても意味がない。 It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of e...

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. -- FEDERALIST 10: The Same Subject Continued: by James Madison （民主主義国と共和国の２大相違点は、第 1 に、後者では、国民によって選ばれた少数の国民に統治が委ねられること、第 2 に、後者が拡大できる国民がより多数で、国の領域がより広大であることです）― フェデラリスト１０：続き：ジェームズ・マディソン 　マディソンの言う民主主義国と共和国の違いは、今で言うところの直接民主制と間接民主制の違いと変わらないように思われる。直接民主制は、かつてアテナイで行われていた政治がその典型とされ、顔を見知った人達が集まり、「合意」によって政治を進めたものである。が、これは小さな社会においては有効であっても、大きな社会では成り立たない。だから、大きな社会では、自分たちの代表を選び、代議員が国会で議論し、「多数決」で物事を決めて行く間接民主制となっているわけである。 ※ 日本は間接民主制を敷いているが、君主たる天皇が存在するので、本来は、共和国ではなく君主国と言うべきである。君主が存在するのに国民主権の民主主義などと言うと矛盾である。だから、大正デモクラシー期、吉野作造は「民本主義」と称したのである。 The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whos...

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.  When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.  Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. -- FEDERALIST 10: The Same Subj...

As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights or property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. -- FEDERALIST 10: The Same Subject Continued: by James Madison （人間の理性が誤り易いまま、それを自由に行使できる限り、様々な意見が形成されます。人間の理性と自己愛...

Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America. -- Federalist No. 9: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection: by Alexander Hamilton （この問題の反対側に立つ作家の中には、このジレンマを認識していたような人もいて、大胆にも大きな州を分割するのが望ましいとさえ仄（ほの）めかしてきました。このような心酔的な政策、必死の方法は、役職を僅かに増やすことによって、狭い範囲での個人の陰謀を超えて影響力を拡大する資格を持たない人々の意見には応えるかもしれませんが、決してアメリカ国民が偉大であり幸福であることを増進できないでしょう）― フェデラリスト９：国内の派閥と反乱に対する安全装置としての連邦の有用性：アレクサンダー・ハミルトン So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the Sta...

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. -- Federalist No. 9: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection: by Alexander Hamilton （それらの共和国の歴史を毀損（きそん）する騒動から、専制政治の擁護者たちは、共和政体だけでなく、市民の自由の原理そのものにも反対する論拠を引き出してきました。彼らは、すべての自由な統治を社会秩序と矛盾するとして非難し、支持者に対して悪意をもって勝ち誇った気持ちに耽（ふけ）ってきたのです）― フェデラリスト９：国内の派閥と反乱に対する安全装置としての連邦の有用性：アレクサンダー・ハミルトン But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have bee...

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies.  An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors." This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY. -- Federalist No. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States: by Alexander Hamilton （不統一の場合、国家間に不和や敵対が生じるの...

The influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulance of another, and the cabals of a third, had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known. -- Federalist No. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States: Alexander Hamilton （ある女性の偏見、別の女性の癇癪（かんしゃく）、また別の女性の陰謀が、欧州の可成りの部分の現代の政策、発酵、平和に及ぼした影響は、余りにも頻繁に詳説されてきたので、広く知られていないはずがありません）― フェデラリスト６：国家間の不和による危険について：アレクサンダー・ハミルトン 　「私的感情」が、最初はちょっとしたいざこざや諍（いさか）い、揉め事を生み、それが騒動や紛争にまで発展するといったことは、歴史を繙（ひもと）けば枚挙に暇（いとま）がないだろう。 If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.   But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each ...

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. -- Federalist No. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States: Alexander Hamilton （万一これらの州が完全に分裂されるか、部分的な連合にだけ統合されたとしても、これらの州が投げ込まれるかもしれない下位区分が、しばしば互いに激しく争い合うと本気で思えない人は、ユートピア思想に酔い痴れているに違いありません。このような争いの動機がないことを、争いが存在することに対する反論と考えることは、人間が野心的で、執念深く、強欲であることを忘れているのでしょう。同じ近隣にある、幾つかの独立した、繋がりのない主権者の間に調和が存続することを期待することは、...

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. -- The Federalist Papers (1787-88): FEDERALIST 5 The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence: by John Jay （仮にアメリカの人々が自らを３つか４つの国に分割したら、同じことが起こるのではないでしょうか？類似の嫉妬心が芽生え、同じように抱（いだ）かれることになるのではないでしょうか？彼らが「愛情で結ばれ」、異なる「利益」に対するあらゆる不安から解放される代わりに、妬（ねた）みや嫉（そね）みがすぐに自信と愛情を消し去り、全米の一般的利益ではなく、各連合の部分的利益が彼らの政策と追求の唯一の目...

whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. -- The Federalist Papers (1787-88): FEDERALIST 4 The Same Subject Continued by John Jay （我国の状況がどのようなものであれ、 1 つの国家政府の下に固く団結していようと、幾つかの連合体に分裂していようと、確かなのは、外国はあるがままそれを見知り、それに応じて我国に対して行動するということです。もし彼らが、我国の政府が効率的で十全に運営され、我国の貿易が手堅く規制され、我国の民兵が適切に組織されて訓練され、我国の資源と財政が慎重に管理され、我国の信用が再確立され、我国の人民が自由に、満足し、団結していることが解れば、我々の憤りを引き起こすより、友情を育む気にずっとなるでしょう）― フェデラリスト４：同じ課題の続き：ジョン・ジェイ QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of th...