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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（36）良心の呵責は守護神

These natural pangs of an affrighted conscience are the daemons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the guilty, which allow them neither quiet nor repose, which often drive them to despair and distraction, from which no assurance of secrecy can protect them, from which no principles of irreligion can entirely deliver them, and from which nothing can free them but the vilest and most abject of all states, a complete insensibility to honour and infamy, to vice and virtue. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《このような生来の恐怖に戦（おのの）く良心の呵責は、現世において罪人に付き纏（まと）い、静寂も安息も与えず、しばしば絶望と乱心へと追いやり、どんな秘密の保証も彼らを守れず、どんな無宗教の原理も彼らを完全に解放できず、名誉や不名誉、悪徳や美徳に対する完全な無感覚という、すべての状態の中で最も価値のない、見捨てられたもの以外、彼らを解放するものは何もない守護神なのである》 ― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 Men of the most detestable characters, who, in the execution of the most dreadful crimes, had taken their measures so coolly as to avoid even the suspicion of guilt, have sometimes been driven, by the horror of their situation, to d
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（35）同胞の憎悪と憤怒の対象

When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he finds that he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. He is abashed and confounded at the thoughts of it, and necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to, if his actions should ever come to be generally known. His imagination, in this case too, anticipates the contempt and derision from which nothing saves him but the ignorance of those he lives with. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《自分がしたことを振り返り、公平な観察者がそれを視るであろう見方で視ると、彼はそれに影響を与えた動機のうち、何１つ共感できないことに気付く。そう思って、愕然とし、困惑し、万一自分の行為が一般に知られるようになれば、必然的に、自分が晒（さら）されることになるであろう恥辱の感度が非常に高くなる。この場合にも、彼は頭の中で、共に暮らす人々がそのことを知らないことしか彼を救うものはない軽蔑と嘲笑を予期するのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He still feels that he is the natural object of these sentiments, and still trembles at the thought of what he would suffer, if they were ever actually exerted against him. But if what he ha
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（34）自己承認（self-approbation）

To desire, or even to accept of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity. To desire it where it is really due, is to desire no more than that a most essential act of justice should be done to us. The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《称賛されるべきでない場合に、称賛を欲することや称賛を受け入れることさえも、最も卑しい虚栄心の成せる業（わざ）でしか有り得ない。本当に称賛されるべき場合に、称賛を欲することは、最も本質的な正義の行為が自分に対してなされることを欲することに過ぎないのである。正義の名声、真の栄光を愛することは、たとえそれ自体のためであっても、そこから得られる利益とは何ら無関係でも、賢者にとっても相応（ふさわ）しくないわけではない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He sometimes, however, neglects, and even despises it; and he is never more apt to do so than when he has the most perfect assurance of the perfect propriety of every part of his own conduct. His self-approbation, in this case, stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation of other men. I
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（33）美徳を愛し、悪徳を嫌う

Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《造物主は、社会のために人間を形づくる際、同胞を喜ばせたいという欲求と、怒らせたくないという嫌悪をはじめに人間に授（さず）けた。 同胞が好意的に見ると喜びを感じ、否定的に見ると苦しみを感じるようにした。同胞が是認するのを、それ自体が彼にとって最も喜ばしく、心地よいものとし、同胞が是認しないのを、最も腹立たしく、不快なものとしたのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 But this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in oth
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（32）公平な観察者が視る観点

The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour. When he views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it. He looks back upon every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better informed. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《経験上、一般的に好ましいとされる行動基準を厳守してきたと自覚している人は、自分の行動が適切であったことを満足げに振り返る。公平な観察者が視る観点で視るとき、彼はそれに影響を与えたすべての動機を徹底的に考察する。彼はそのあらゆる部分を、喜びと称賛をもって振り返る。人間は自分のしてきたことを決して知るはずはないのだろうけれども、彼は自分自身を、人々が実際に彼を見る見方によってではなく、もっと情報に通じていたら彼を見るであろう見方によって見るのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He anticipates the ap
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（31）無知で根拠のない称賛

But their vanity arises from so gross an illusion of the imagination, that it is difficult to conceive how any rational creature should be imposed upon by it. When they place themselves in the situation of those whom they fancy they have deceived, they are struck with the highest admiration for their own persons. They look upon themselves, not in that light in which, they know, they ought to appear to their companions, but in that in which they believe their companions actually look upon them. Their superficial weakness and trivial folly hinder them from ever turning their eyes inwards, or from seeing themselves in that despicable point of view in which their own consciences must tell them that they would appear to every body, if the real truth should ever come to be known. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the lo
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アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』（30）無知や思い違いによる尊敬と称賛

The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness. It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us. If we are conscious that we do not deserve to be so favourably thought of, and that if the truth were known, we should be regarded with very different sentiments, our satisfaction is far from being complete. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 《どんなに心からの賞賛であっても、それが賞賛に値するものであることの何某（なにがし）かの証拠だと見做（みな）せなければ、ほとんど喜びを与えられない。無知や思い違いによって、何らかの方法で、尊敬され、称賛されても決して満足はしない。自分はこれほど好評価されるに値しない、本当のことが分かれば、まったく違った感情で評価されるはずだと自覚しているとすれば、私達の満足は完全なものとは程遠くなる》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第
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