名著探究

《「社会の秩序を保つもの」とは一体何なのでしょうか？ 　人間が「正しい行動」をして、「悪い行い」をしないのは、人間の中にある様々な感情が作用しあった結果とスミスは考えました。そしてそれは「同感」というキーワードに凝縮されています》（木暮太一『アダム・スミス ぼくらはいかに働き、いかに生きるべきか』（日経ビジネス人文庫）、 p. 53 ） （注）「同感」：スミスは、 compassion という語を用いている。 com （同じ） passion （感情）ということなので、拙ブログでは「同情」と訳した。 《この「同感」が人間社会の秩序を保っている、とスミスは考えていました。 　スミスの道徳観、さらには経済理論を理解するうえで、この「同感（同類感情）」の概念を外すことはできません。スミスのすべてはこの「同感」を前提にしていると言っても過言ではないのです》（同、 pp. 53f ） 　「同類感情」に該当する英語は fellow-feeling であって、 compassion と同じ意味と考えるのは少し雑な感じがする。「同類感情」略して「同感」ではない。が、スミスの道徳論の基礎に compassion が置かれていることはその通りであろうと思われる。 《この「同感」は、意味としては「共感」と似ています。しかし、もう少し奥が深い考え方なので、ここから少し丁寧に「同感」の概念をひもといていきます》 人間が如何に利己的だと思われようとも、人間の本性には、他人の幸運に関心を持ち、他人の幸福を見る喜び以外には何も得られないにもかかわらず、その幸福を自分にとって必要なものとする原理があることは明らかである。（スミス『道徳感情論』： 拙ブログ (1) 同情（pity or compassion） 参照 ） 《試験に受かって喜んでいる人がいれば、「やったね！ 嬉しいよね！！」と思い、家族や恋人が亡くなった人を見ると「お察しします、さぞかし悲しいでしょう……」と感じる。 　また、自分の財産を理不尽に強奪された人が、それを取り戻すために戦っていると、応援したくなる。一方で、理由もなく人を傷つけたり、盗みをはたらく人に対しては、怒りの感情を覚えます。たとえ自分がその「事件」の被害者ではなくても、当事者の気持ちになって同類の感情、怒りや悲しみを覚えるのです。 　...

A true party-man hates and despises candour; and, in reality, there is no vice which could so effectually disqualify him for the trade of a party-man as that single virtue. The real, revered, and impartial spectator, therefore, is, upon no occasion, at a greater distance than amidst the violence and rage of contending parties. To them, it may be said, that such a spectator scarce exists any where in the universe. Even to the great Judge of the universe, they impute all their own prejudices, and often view that Divine Being as animated by all their own vindictive and implacable passions. Of all the corrupters of moral sentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《真の党員は、公正を嫌い、軽蔑するが、実際、その直向（ひたむ）きな美徳ほど、効果的に彼から党員仲間としての資格を奪うであろう悪徳はない。従って、真の、尊敬される公平な観察者は、如何なる場合においても、互いに抗争する政党が暴力と怒りの渦中にあるときほど、距離をとることはない。彼らに言わせれば、そのような観察者は宇宙のどこにも存在しないのである。宇宙の偉大な審判者にさえ、彼らは自分たちの偏見を転嫁し、しばしばその神聖な存在が自分たちの和解し難い復讐感情...

That the innocent, though they may have some connexion or dependency upon the guilty (which, perhaps, they themselves cannot help), should not, upon that account, suffer or be punished for the guilty, is one of the plainest and most obvious rules of justice. In the most unjust war, however, it is commonly the sovereign or the rulers only who are guilty. The subjects are almost always perfectly innocent. Whenever it suits the conveniency of a public enemy, however, the goods of the peaceable citizens are seized both at land and at sea; their lands are laid waste, their houses are burnt, and they themselves, if they presume to make any resistance, are murdered or led into captivity; and all this in the most perfect conformity to what are called the laws of nations. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《罪のない人達が、たとえ罪人との間に（彼ら自身にはどうすることもできないであろう）何らかの関係や依存関係があったとしても、そのことを理由にして、罪人として苦しんだり罰せられたりしてはならないということは、正義の最も明白で疑う余地のない決まりの１つである。しかしながら、最も不法な戦争では、通常、罰を受けるべきは君主や支配者...

Of the conduct of one independent nation towards another, neutral nations are the only indifferent and impartial spectators. But they are placed at so great a distance that they are almost quite out of sight. When two nations are at variance, the citizen of each pays little regard to the sentiments which foreign nations may entertain concerning his conduct. His whole ambition is to obtain the approbation of his own fellow-citizens; and as they are all animated by the same hostile passions which animate himself, he can never please them so much as by enraging and offending their enemies. The partial spectator is at hand: the impartial one at a great distance. In war and negotiation, therefore, the laws of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded. Treaties are violated; and the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds scarce any dishonour upon the violator. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《１つの独立国が他...

Are you in adversity? Do not mourn in the darkness of solitude, do not regulate your sorrow according to the indulgent sympathy of your intimate friends; return, as soon as possible, to the day-light of the world and of society. Live with strangers, with those who know nothing, or care nothing about your misfortune; do not even shun the company of enemies; but give yourself the pleasure of mortifying their malignant joy, by making them feel how little you are affected by your calamity, and how much you are above it. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《貴方は逆境に陥（おちい）っていますか？ 独り暗闇の中で嘆き悲しまないでください。貴方の親しい友人が優しく共感してくれるかどうかで悲しみを調整しないでください。一刻も早く、世間と社会の昼の光へと戻ってください。見ず知らずの人達、何も知らない人達、貴方の不幸に何の関心もない人達と共生してください。敵と交わることも避けず、貴方がどれほど災難に動じず、どれほど災難を超越しているかを彼らに感じさせ、彼らの悪意に満ちた喜びを抑えるのを楽しんでください》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 Are you in prosperity? Do not confine the enjoyment of your good fortune to your own house, to the company of your own friends, perhaps of your flatterers, of those ...

Under the boisterous and stormy sky of war and faction, of public tumult and confusion, the sturdy severity of self-command prospers the most, and can be the most successfully cultivated. But, in such situations, the strongest suggestions of humanity must frequently be stifled or neglected; and every such neglect necessarily tends to weaken the principle of humanity. As it may frequently be the duty of a soldier not to take, so it may sometimes be his duty not to give quarter; and the humanity of the man who has been several times under the necessity of submitting to this disagreeable duty, can scarce fail to suffer a considerable diminution. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《戦争や派閥争い、大衆の暴動や混乱の荒れ狂う嵐のような空の下では、克己という不屈の厳しさが最も栄え、最もうまく培（つちか）われる。しかし、そのような状況では、いくら強く慈悲が勧められたとしても、しばしば抑えられ、無視されるに違いなく、あらゆるこのような無視は、必然的に慈悲の原則を弱めることになる。慈悲心を持たないことが、しばしば兵士の義務であるように、慈悲心を与えないことも、義務であるかもしれないし、この嫌な義務に何度も従わなければならなくなった人の慈悲心は、ほとんど必ずといってかなり低下するはずである》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 For ...

The person best fitted by nature for acquiring the former of those two sets of virtues, is likewise best fitted for acquiring the latter. The man who feels the most for the joys and sorrows of others, is best fitted for acquiring the most complete control of his own joys and sorrows. The man of the most exquisite humanity, is naturally the most capable of acquiring the highest degree of self-command. He may not, however, always have acquired it; and it very frequently happens that he has not. He may have lived too much in ease and tranquillity. He may have never been exposed to the violence of faction, or to the hardships and hazards of war. He may have never experienced the insolence of his superiors, the jealous and malignant envy of his equals, or the pilfering injustice of his inferiors. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《この２組の美徳のうちの前者を身に付けるのに生来最も適した人は、同様に後者を身に付けるのにも最も適している。他人の喜びや悲しみに最も同情する人は、自分の喜びや悲しみをこの上なく完全に抑制する能力が最も高い。最も繊細な慈悲心のある人は、必然的に最も高度な克己心（こっ...

The prisoner, who is continually plotting to escape from his confinement, cannot enjoy that careless security which even a prison can afford him. The medicines of the physician are often the greatest torment of the incurable patient. The monk who, in order to comfort Joanna of Castile, upon the death of her husband Philip, told her of a King, who, fourteen years after his decease, had been restored to life again, by the prayers of his afflicted queen, was not likely, by his legendary tale, to restore sedateness to the distempered mind of that unhappy Princess. She endeavoured to repeat the same experiment in hopes of the same success; resisted for a long time the burial of her husband, soon after raised his body from the grave, attended it almost constantly herself, and watched, with all the impatient anxiety of frantic expectation, the happy moment when her wishes were to be gratified by the revival of her beloved Philip. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II ...

In the end, Time, the great and universal comforter, gradually composes the weak man to the same degree of tranquillity which a regard to his own dignity and manhood teaches the wise man to assume in the beginning. The case of the man with the wooden leg is an obvious example of this. In the irreparable misfortunes occasioned by the death of children, or of friends and relations, even a wise man may for some time indulge himself in some degree of moderated sorrow. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《結局のところ、万人の偉大な助け主たる「時」は、自らの尊厳と男らしさへの配慮が賢者に最初に抱かせるのと同程度の平穏へと徐々にその弱者を落ち着かせるのである。木製の義足をした男の例は、このことがよく分かる例である。子供の死、友人や親戚の死といった回復不可能な不幸に見舞われれば、賢明な人間でさえ、多少控えめではあれ、暫（しば）し悲しみに浸ることだろう》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 An affectionate, but weak woman, is often, upon such occasions, almost perfectly distracted. Time, however, in a longer or shorter period, never fails to compose the weakest woman to the same degree of tranquillity as the strongest man. In all the irreparable calami...

In the most glittering and exalted situation that our idle fancy can hold out to us, the pleasures from which we propose to derive our real happiness, are almost always the same with those which, in our actual, though humble station, we have at all times at hand, and in our power. Except the frivolous pleasures of vanity and superiority, we may find, in the most humble station, where there is only personal liberty, every other which the most exalted can afford; and the pleasures of vanity and superiority are seldom consistent with perfect tranquillity, the principle and foundation of all real and satisfactory enjoyment. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《妄想が私達に差し出す最も煌（きら）びやかで、高貴な状況において、私達が真の幸福を得ようとする快楽は、たとえ卑しくとも、現実の身分において、いつも手元にあり、自分の力で手に入る快楽と、ほとんど常に変わらない。たとえ個人的な自由しかないような卑しい身分であっても、最も高貴な者が手にできる、虚栄心や優越感といった軽薄な快楽以外のあらゆる快楽が見付かるだろうし、虚栄心や優越感という快楽は、すべての真の、満足できる快楽の原理であり基礎となる完全な平穏と一致することは滅多にない》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 Neither is it always certain that, in the spl...

The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another. Avarice over-rates the difference between poverty and riches: ambition, that between a private and a public station: vain-glory, that between obscurity and extensive reputation. The person under the influence of any of those extravagant passions, is not only miserable in his actual situation, but is often disposed to disturb the peace of society, in order to arrive at that which he so foolishly admires. The slightest observation, however, might satisfy him, that, in all the ordinary situations of human life, a well-disposed mind may be equally calm, equally cheerful, and equally contented. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《人生における苦悩と混乱の大きな源は、永続的な境遇間の違いを過大評価することから生じているように思われる。貪欲は貧困と富裕の違いを過大評価し、野心は私的な地位と公的な地位の違いを過大評価し、虚栄心は無名と大評判の違いを過大評価する。これらの極端な感情に動かされている人は、実際の状況が悲惨であるだけでなく、自分が愚かにも称賛するものに辿り着くために、よく社会の平...

A man with a wooden leg suffers, no doubt, and foresees that he must continue to suffer during the remainder of his life, a very considerable inconveniency. He soon comes to view it, however, exactly as every impartial spectator views it; as an inconveniency under which he can enjoy all the ordinary pleasures both of solitude and of society. He soon identifies himself with the ideal man within the breast, he soon becomes himself the impartial spectator of his own situation. He no longer weeps, he no longer laments, he no longer grieves over it, as a weak man may sometimes do in the beginning. The view of the impartial spectator becomes so perfectly habitual to him, that, without any effort, without any exertion, he never thinks of surveying his misfortune in any other view. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《木製の義足の人が苦しむのは間違いないし、相当な不便を余生において被（こうむ）り続けなければならないと予見される。しかしながら、彼はすぐに、不便であっても、あらゆる公平な観察者が視るのと正しく同じように、独りにおける楽しみも、社会における楽しみもすべて日々享受できると考えるようになる。彼はすぐに、胸...

His sense of honour, his regard to his own dignity, directs him to fix his whole attention upon the one view. His natural, his untaught and undisciplined feelings, are continually calling it off to the other. He does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the ideal man within the breast, he does not become himself the impartial spectator of his own conduct. The different views of both characters exist in his mind separate and distinct from one another, and each directing him to a behaviour different from that to which the other directs him. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《自尊心、自らの威厳への配慮があれば、彼は、後者〔公平な観察者〕の見方に全神経を集中させる。彼の自然な感情、教育されていない感情、訓練されていない感情は、常に前者〔自分自身〕へと注意を逸（そ）らす。この場合、彼は、胸中の理想的な人間と自分を完全に重ね合わせることはなく、自分自身の行為の公平な観察者になることもない。両者の異なる見解は、互いに別個に彼の心の中に存在し、それぞれが、他方が彼に仕向ける行動とは違った行動を彼に仕向けるのである》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 When he follows that view which honour and dignity point out to him, Nature does not, indeed, leave him without a recompense. He en...

With most men, upon such an accident, their own natural view of their own misfortune would force itself upon them with such a vivacity and strength of colouring, as would entirely efface all thought of every other view. They would feel nothing, they could attend to nothing, but their own pain and their own fear; and not only the judgment of the ideal man within the breast, but that of the real spectators who might happen to be present, would be entirely overlooked and disregarded. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《大抵の人は、このような災難に遭うと、自分の災厄に対する自然な見方が、生き生きとした色彩の強さで自分に押し掛けるので、他のすべての見方の苦悩をすべて完全に消し去ってしまうだろう。彼らは何も感じず、何も気に懸けず、ただ自分の苦痛と恐怖を感じ、胸中の理想の人の判断だけでなく、たまたまそこに居合わせた実際の見物人の判断も、全く看過され、無視されるだろう》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 The reward which Nature bestows upon good behaviour under misfortune, is thus exactly proportioned to the degree of that good behaviour. The only compensation she could possibly make for the bitterness of pain and distress is thus too, in equal degr...

The man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man who has been thoroughly bred in the great school of self-command, in the bustle and business of the world, exposed, perhaps, to the violence and injustice of faction, and to the hardships and hazards of war, maintains this control of his passive feelings upon all occasions; and whether in solitude or in society, wears nearly the same countenance, and is affected very nearly in the same manner. - Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《真に志操堅固の人、自制心の偉大な学校で徹底的に躾（しつ）けられた賢明で正義感の強い人が、世の中の喧騒（けんそう）と多忙の中で、恐らくは派閥の暴力と不正義、戦争の苦難と危険に晒（さら）されながらも、あらゆる場面で、この受動的な感情を御（ぎょ）し続け、独りでいる時も社会の中にいる時も、ほとんど同じ表情をし、ほとんど同じように感動するのである》― 同―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 In success and in disappointment, in prosperity and in adversity, before friends and before enemies, he has often been under the necessity of supporting this manhood. He has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial spectator would pass upon his sen...

With a man of a little more firmness, the effect is somewhat more permanent. He endeavours, as much as he can, to fix his attention upon the view which the company are likely to take of his situation. He feels, at the same time, the esteem and approbation which they naturally conceive for him when he thus preserves his tranquillity; and, though under the pressure of some recent and great calamity, appears to feel for himself no more than what they really feel for him. He approves and applauds himself by sympathy with their approbation, and the pleasure which he derives from this sentiment supports and enables him more easily to continue this generous effort. -- Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《もう少ししっかりした人であれば、その効果はもう少し続く。彼は、自分の置かれた状況について、仲間が多分するだろう観察に出来る限り目を向けようとする。同時に、こうして平静を保っているから、仲間が自然に抱く彼への尊敬と称賛を感知するので、新たに大きな災いの重圧を受けても、仲間が彼に実際同情しているほど自分に同情しないように思われる。彼は、仲間の称賛に共感することで、自分を承認し、称賛するので、この感情から得られる喜びのお陰で支えられ、このようにより容易に惜しみなく努力し続けられるのである》― 同―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：...

By noise and threatening they are, for their own ease, often obliged to frighten it into good temper; and the passion which incites it to attack, is restrained by that which teaches it to attend to its own safety. When it is old enough to go to school, or to mix with its equals, it soon finds that they have no such indulgent partiality. It naturally wishes to gain their favour, and to avoid their hatred or contempt. Regard even to its own safety teaches it to do so; and it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than by moderating, not only its anger, but all its other passions, to the degree which its play-fellows and companions are likely to be pleased with. It thus enters into the great school of self-command, it studies to be more and more master of itself, and begins to exercise over its own feelings a discipline which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfection. -- Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《...

The affliction of an innocent young lady, on account of the groundless surmises which may have been circulated concerning her conduct, appears often perfectly amiable. Persons of an advanced age, whom long experience of the folly and injustice of the world, has taught to pay little regard, either to its censure or to its applause, neglect and despise obloquy, and do not even deign to honour its futile authors with any serious resentment. This indifference, which is founded altogether on a firm confidence in their own well-tried and well-established characters, would be disagreeable in young people, who neither can nor ought to have any such confidence. It might in them be supposed to forebode, in their advancing years, a most improper insensibility to real honour and infamy. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《罪のない若い女性が、自らの行為に関して流された根も葉もない憶測のせいで苦しむのは、非常にしおらしく思われることが多い。世の中が愚かで不公平であることを長年経験して、非難されても称賛されてもほとんど気に留めなくなった高齢者は、誹謗（ひぼう）を無視・嫌悪し、そんな下（くだ）らないことを言う者に本気で...

The mere want of fortune, mere poverty, excites little compassion. Its complaints are too apt to be the objects rather of contempt than of fellow-feeling. We despise a beggar; and, though his importunities may extort an alms from us, he is scarce ever the object of any serious commiseration. The fall from riches to poverty, as it commonly occasions the most real distress to the sufferer, so it seldom fails to excite the most sincere commiseration in the spectator. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments : 3.1.2. Chap. II 《ただ付いてないだけ、貧乏なだけでは、ほとんど同情を誘わない。それを愚痴ったところで、同情は愚（おろ）か、軽蔑の的にされるのが落ちである。私達は、乞食（こじき）を軽蔑する。しつこく強請（ゆす）り施（ほどこ）しを得られたとしても、乞食が純粋に同情の的となることはほとんどない。富裕から貧困へ転落すれば、ふつう極めて現実的な苦痛がその人に齎（もたら）されるように、見ている人に極めて真摯（しんし）な同情を引き起こさないことは滅多にない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 Though, in the present state of society, this misfortune can seldom happen without some misconduct, and some very considerable misconduct too, in the sufferer; yet he is almost always so much pitied that he is scarce ever al...

The sense of propriety, so far from requiring us to eradicate altogether that extraordinary sensibility, which we naturally feel for the misfortunes of our nearest connections, is always much more offended by the defect, than it ever is by the excess of that sensibility. The stoical apathy is, in such cases, never agreeable, and all the metaphysical sophisms by which it is supported can seldom serve any other purpose than to blow up the hard insensibility of a coxcomb to ten times its native impertinence. The poets and romance writers, who best paint the refinements and delicacies of love and friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections, Racine and Voltaire; Richardson, Maurivaux, and Riccoboni; are, in such cases, much better instructors than Zeno, Chrysippus, or Epictetus. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ：>3.1.2. Chap. II 《妥当かどうかの判断から、親類の不幸に対し自然に抱く特別な感覚を完全に消し去るように求めたりはしないが、常に、その感覚が過敏であるよりも、不足することの方が、その判断はずっと損（そこ）なわれる。このような場合、冷静な無関心は決して好感を持たれるものではなく、そ...

They exhort us, on the contrary, to an affectionate attention to our parents, and to make a proper return to them, in their old age, for the kindness which they had shown to us in our infancy and youth. In the Decalogue we are commanded to honour our fathers and mothers. No mention is made of the love of our children. Nature had sufficiently prepared us for the performance of this latter duty. Men are seldom accused of affecting to be fonder of their children than they really are. They have sometimes been suspected of displaying their piety to their parents with too much ostentation. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ：3.1.2. Chap. II 《それとは逆に、彼ら〔＝倫理学者〕は、親には愛情をもって接し、親が老いれば、幼青年期に受けた恩をきちんと返すように勧めるのである。モーセの十戒（じっかい）では、父母を敬うよう命じられている。子供を愛することについては言及されていない。造物主は、私達に、この後者の義務を果たすための準備を万端にさせていた。人は、自分の子供たちを実際以上に可愛がる素振りを見せたからといって非難されることは滅多にない。時として親孝行を誇示しすぎではないかと思われる》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 The ostentatious sorrow of widows has, for a like reason, been suspected of insincerity. We shoul...

Those private misfortunes, for which our feelings are apt to go beyond the bounds of propriety, are of two different kinds. They are either such as affect us only indirectly, by affecting, in the first place, some other persons who are particularly dear to us; such as our parents, our children, our brothers and sisters, our intimate friends; or they are such as affect ourselves immediately and directly, either in our body, in our fortune, or in our reputation; such as pain, sickness, approaching death, poverty, disgrace, etc. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ：3.1.2. Chap. II 《ともすれば感情が妥当な範囲を超えがちな私的不幸には２種類ある。それは、そもそも自分にとって特に大切な、例えば、両親、子供、兄弟姉妹、親友といった他の人を感動させることによって間接的にしか自分を感動させないようなものか、身体、財産、名声のいずれかに、即座にそして直接自分を感動させるような、例えば、痛み、病気、近寄る死の影、貧困、不名誉といったものかのいずれかである》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 In misfortunes of the first kind, our emotions may, no doubt, go very much beyond what exact propriety will admit of; but they may likewise fall short of it, and they frequently do so. The man wh...

It is never objected to us that we have too little fellow-feeling with the joy of success. Wherever envy does not prevent it, the favour which we bear to prosperity is rather apt to be too great; and the same moralists who blame us for want of sufficient sympathy with the miserable, reproach us for the levity with which we are too apt to admire and almost to worship the fortunate, the powerful, and the rich.–Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ：3.1.2. Chap. II 《成功の喜びに対する仲間意識が弱すぎると言って反感を有（も）たれることは決してない。嫉妬（しっと）によって抑えられなければ、成功に対して抱く好意は、むしろ大きくなりすぎる嫌いがある。私達が惨（みじ）めな人々への共感が不十分であると非難する例の倫理学者たちは、軽薄にも、幸運な人々、権力者、金持ちたちを称賛し、崇拝すると言ってもよい傾向が私達には強すぎると非難する》―アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第３部：第３章 Among the moralists who endeavour to correct the natural inequality of our passive feelings by diminishing our sensibility to what peculiarly concerns ourselves, we may count all the ancient sects of philosophers, but particularly the ancient Stoics. Man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself, not as someth...