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These natural pangs of an affrighted conscience are the daemons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the guilty, which allow them neither quiet nor repose, which often drive them to despair and distraction, from which no assurance of secrecy can protect them, from which no principles of irreligion can entirely deliver them, and from which nothing can free them but the vilest and most abject of all states, a complete insensibility to honour and infamy, to vice and virtue. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《このような生来の恐怖に戦（おのの）く良心の呵責は、現世において罪人に付き纏（まと）い、静寂も安息も与えず、しばしば絶望と乱心へと追いやり、どんな秘密の保証も彼らを守れず、どんな無宗教の原理も彼らを完全に解放できず、名誉や不名誉、悪徳や美徳に対する完全な無感覚という、すべての状態の中で最も価値のない、見捨てられたもの以外、彼らを解放するものは何もない守護神なのである》 ― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 Men of the most detestable characters, who, in the execution of the most dreadful crimes, had taken their measures so coolly as to avoid even the suspicion of guilt, have sometimes been driven, by the horror of their situation, to d

When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he finds that he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. He is abashed and confounded at the thoughts of it, and necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to, if his actions should ever come to be generally known. His imagination, in this case too, anticipates the contempt and derision from which nothing saves him but the ignorance of those he lives with. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《自分がしたことを振り返り、公平な観察者がそれを視るであろう見方で視ると、彼はそれに影響を与えた動機のうち、何１つ共感できないことに気付く。そう思って、愕然とし、困惑し、万一自分の行為が一般に知られるようになれば、必然的に、自分が晒（さら）されることになるであろう恥辱の感度が非常に高くなる。この場合にも、彼は頭の中で、共に暮らす人々がそのことを知らないことしか彼を救うものはない軽蔑と嘲笑を予期するのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He still feels that he is the natural object of these sentiments, and still trembles at the thought of what he would suffer, if they were ever actually exerted against him. But if what he ha

To desire, or even to accept of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity. To desire it where it is really due, is to desire no more than that a most essential act of justice should be done to us. The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《称賛されるべきでない場合に、称賛を欲することや称賛を受け入れることさえも、最も卑しい虚栄心の成せる業（わざ）でしか有り得ない。本当に称賛されるべき場合に、称賛を欲することは、最も本質的な正義の行為が自分に対してなされることを欲することに過ぎないのである。正義の名声、真の栄光を愛することは、たとえそれ自体のためであっても、そこから得られる利益とは何ら無関係でも、賢者にとっても相応（ふさわ）しくないわけではない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He sometimes, however, neglects, and even despises it; and he is never more apt to do so than when he has the most perfect assurance of the perfect propriety of every part of his own conduct. His self-approbation, in this case, stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation of other men. I

Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《造物主は、社会のために人間を形づくる際、同胞を喜ばせたいという欲求と、怒らせたくないという嫌悪をはじめに人間に授（さず）けた。 同胞が好意的に見ると喜びを感じ、否定的に見ると苦しみを感じるようにした。同胞が是認するのを、それ自体が彼にとって最も喜ばしく、心地よいものとし、同胞が是認しないのを、最も腹立たしく、不快なものとしたのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 But this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in oth

The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour. When he views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it. He looks back upon every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better informed. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《経験上、一般的に好ましいとされる行動基準を厳守してきたと自覚している人は、自分の行動が適切であったことを満足げに振り返る。公平な観察者が視る観点で視るとき、彼はそれに影響を与えたすべての動機を徹底的に考察する。彼はそのあらゆる部分を、喜びと称賛をもって振り返る。人間は自分のしてきたことを決して知るはずはないのだろうけれども、彼は自分自身を、人々が実際に彼を見る見方によってではなく、もっと情報に通じていたら彼を見るであろう見方によって見るのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He anticipates the ap

But their vanity arises from so gross an illusion of the imagination, that it is difficult to conceive how any rational creature should be imposed upon by it. When they place themselves in the situation of those whom they fancy they have deceived, they are struck with the highest admiration for their own persons. They look upon themselves, not in that light in which, they know, they ought to appear to their companions, but in that in which they believe their companions actually look upon them. Their superficial weakness and trivial folly hinder them from ever turning their eyes inwards, or from seeing themselves in that despicable point of view in which their own consciences must tell them that they would appear to every body, if the real truth should ever come to be known. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the lo

The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness. It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us. If we are conscious that we do not deserve to be so favourably thought of, and that if the truth were known, we should be regarded with very different sentiments, our satisfaction is far from being complete. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 《どんなに心からの賞賛であっても、それが賞賛に値するものであることの何某（なにがし）かの証拠だと見做（みな）せなければ、ほとんど喜びを与えられない。無知や思い違いによって、何らかの方法で、尊敬され、称賛されても決して満足はしない。自分はこれほど好評価されるに値しない、本当のことが分かれば、まったく違った感情で評価されるはずだと自覚しているとすれば、私達の満足は完全なものとは程遠くなる》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第

The love of praise-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 《称賛に値するものを愛することは、称賛を愛することからすべて派生したものでは決してない。この２つの原理は、互いに似通っていて、繋がっていて、しばしば混合されているけれども、多くの点で、互いに異なり、独立したものである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部 自分自身の感情と行為に関する判断の基礎と１編からなる義務の感覚について：第２章 称賛の愛することと称賛に値するものを愛すること、並びに、非難を恐れることと非難に値することを怖れることについて The love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose character and conduct we approve of, necessarily dispose us to desire to become ourselves the objects o

The second is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far soever it may be removed from absolute perfection, seems to deserve applause; and whatever falls short of it, to deserve blame. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 《２つ目は、人間の大部分の行動が普通に到達する、このような完全完璧なものからどの程度の近いのか、遠いのかという考え方である。絶対的完全からどれほど離れていても、この程度を上回るものは称賛に値し、この程度を下回るものは非難に値すると思われる》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第５章 愛すべき立派な美徳について It is in the same manner that we judge of the productions of all the arts which address themselves to the imagination. When a critic examines the work of any of the great masters in poetry or painting, he may sometimes examine it by an idea of perfection, in hi

On the contrary, there may frequently be a considerable degree of virtue in those actions which fall short of the most perfect propriety; because they may still approach nearer to perfection than could well be expected upon occasions in which it was so extremely difficult to attain it: and this is very often the case upon those occasions which require the greatest exertions of self-command.  There are some situations which bear so hard upon human nature, that the greatest degree of self-government, which can belong to so imperfect a creature as man, is not able to stifle, altogether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions to that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 《それどころか、非の打ち所のないほど適切だとまでは言えない行為であっても、しばしば相

As taste and good judgment, when they are considered as qualities which deserve praise and admiration, are supposed to imply a delicacy of sentiment and an acuteness of understanding not commonly to be met with; so the virtues of sensibility and self-command are not apprehended to consist in the ordinary, but in the uncommon degrees of those qualities. The amiable virtue of humanity requires, surely, a sensibility, much beyond what is possessed by the rude vulgar of mankind. The great and exalted virtue of magnanimity undoubtedly demands much more than that degree of self-command, which the weakest of mortals is capable of exerting. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 《趣味や判断力が、賞賛に値する資質と見做（みな）されるとき、通常触れることのない感情の繊細さや知性の鋭さを意味すると考えられているように、思いやりや自制という美徳は、在（あ）り来（き）たりではなく、稀な段階の資質にあると考えられている。思い遣りという立派な美徳には、野蛮な俗人が有するものを遥かに超えた感

On the other hand, what noble propriety and grace do we feel in the conduct of those who, in their own case, exert that recollection and self-command which constitute the dignity of every passion, and which bring it down to what others can enter into! We are disgusted with that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon our compassion with sighs and tears and importunate lamentations. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 《他方、自分自身の場合、あらゆる感情の品位を成し、それを他人が共鳴できる程度にまで低めるよう、想起し、自制する人々の行動には、なんと高貴な礼儀と気品が感じられることであろうか！ 何の心遣いもなく、溜息を吐（つ）き、涙を流し、執拗に嘆いて私達の同情を買いたがる喧（かまびす）しい嘆きにはうんざりしてしまう》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第５章 愛すべき立派な美徳について But we reverence that reserved, that silent and majestic sorrow, which discovers itself only in the swelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and c

Upon these two different efforts, upon that of the spectator to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned, and upon that of the person principally concerned, to bring down his emotions to what the spectator can go along with, are founded two different sets of virtues. The soft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity, are founded upon the one: the great, the awful and respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-government, of that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require, take their origin from the other. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 《この２つの異なる努力の上に、すなわち、見物人が主当事者の感情を汲み取る努力と、主当事者が見物人の同調できる程度に自分の感情を下げる努力の上に、異なる ２ 組の美徳が成り立っている。控えめ

The mind, therefore, is rarely so disturbed, but that the company of a friend will restore it to some degree of tranquillity and sedateness. The breast is, in some measure, calmed and composed the moment we come into his presence. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. IV The same subject continued 《それゆえ、心がそれほど掻き乱されることは滅多にないが、友人が一緒であれば、ある程度落ち着きを取り戻せるだろう。友人と一緒になった瞬間、胸は幾らか落ち着くのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 4 章 同じ問題の続き We are immediately put in mind of the light in which he will view our situation, and we begin to view it ourselves in the same light; for the effect of sympathy is instantaneous. We expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend: we cannot open to the former all those little circumstances which we can unfold to the latter: we assume, therefore, more tranquillity before him, and endeavour t

These two sentiments, however, may, it is evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. IV The same subject continued 《しかしながら、この ２ つの感情は、社会が調和するのに十分な程度、互いに対応し合うのは明らかである。両者は決して合致することはなくとも、調和するであろう。そして、求められ必要とされるのはこれだけである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 4 章 同じ問題の続き In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs, and t