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They were the virtues, perhaps, most suitable to their station, and in which they themselves chiefly excelled; and we are all naturally disposed to over-rate the excellencies of our own characters. In the discourse which the eloquent and philosophical Massillon pronounced, on giving his benediction to the standards of the regiment of Catinat, there is the following address to the officers: 'What is most deplorable in your situation, Gentlemen, is, that in a life hard and painful, in which the services and the duties sometimes go beyond the rigour and severity. of the most austere cloisters; you suffer always in vain for the life to come, and frequently even for this life. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《それはおそらく、彼らの地位に最も相応（ふさわ）しく、彼ら自身が取り分け秀でていた美徳であった。そして、私達は皆、生まれながらに自分の性格が素晴らしいと過大評価する傾向がある。雄弁で冷静なマシロンが、カティナ連隊の軍旗に祝福を与えるに際し述べた演説中に、士官たちに向けた次のような言葉がある。「諸君の置かれた状況において最も嘆かわしいことは、奉仕と任務が時に最も厳粛な回廊の厳しさを超える辛く苦しい生活において、来世のため、そして、しばしば現世のためにさえ苦しんだとて常に無駄だということだ》― アダ...

That there is a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, where every man will be ranked with those who, in the moral and intellectual qualities, are really his equals; where the owner of those humble talents and virtues which, from being depressed by fortune, had, in this life, no opportunity of displaying themselves; which were unknown, not only to the public, but which he himself could scarce be sure that he possessed, and for which even the man within the breast could scarce venture to afford him any distinct and clear testimony; where that modest, silent, and unknown merit, will be placed upon a level, and sometimes above those who, in this world, had enjoyed the highest reputation, and who, from the advantage of their situation, had been enabled to perform the most splendid and dazzling actions; is a doctrine, in every respect so venerable, so comfortable to the weakness, so flattering to the grandeur of human nature, that the virtuous man who has the misfortu...

In such cases, this demigod within the breast appears, like the demigods of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal extraction. When his judgments are steadily and firmly directed by the sense of praiseworthiness and blame-worthiness, he seems to act suitably to his divine extraction: But when he suffers himself to be astonished and confounded by the judgments of ignorant and weak man, he discovers his connexion with mortality, and appears to act suitably, rather to the human, than to the divine, part of his origin. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《このような場合、この胸中の半神半人は、詩人の半神半人のように、部分的に不死の素性を有するけれども、部分的に死すべき素性も有するように思われる。称賛に値するもの、非難に値するものという感覚によって、その判断が着実堅固に方向付けられる場合は、神聖な素性に相応（ふさわ）しい行動を取るように思われる。しかし、無知で薄弱な人間の判断にびっくり仰天してしまうと、自分が死すべき運命と繋がっていることに気付き、自分の出自の神的な部分よりも、むしろ人間的な部分に相応しい行動を取るように思われるのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 In such cases, the only effectual consolation of humbled and afflicted man lies in an appeal to a still higher tribu...

If the man without should applaud us, either for actions which we have not performed, or for motives which had no influence upon us; the man within can immediately humble that pride and elevation of mind which such groundless acclamations might otherwise occasion, by telling us, that as we know that we do not deserve them, we render ourselves despicable by accepting them. If, on the contrary, the man without should reproach us, either for actions which we never performed, or for motives which had no influence upon those which we may have performed; the man within may immediately correct this false judgment, and assure us, that we are by no means the proper objects of that censure which has so unjustly been bestowed upon us. -- Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments > 3.1.2. Chap. II 《もし外部の人間が、私達が実行したことのない行為や、私達に何の影響力も及ぼさなかった動機に拍手喝采するなら、内部の人間は、私達がそのような拍手喝采に値しないことが分かっていながら、拍手喝采を受け入れれば、私達を見下げ果てたものにしてしまうと忠告することによって、そうしないとそのような根拠のない拍手喝采が齎（もたら）しかねない自惚（うぬぼ）れや精神高揚の鼻を即座に折ることができるのである。それ...

'Many people,' says Cicero, 'despise glory, who are yet most severely mortified by unjust reproach; and that most inconsistently.' This inconsistency, however, seems to be founded in the unalterable principles of human nature. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《キケロは「不当な非難によって最も酷く傷付けられる多くの人々が、栄光を軽んじているのは、最も矛盾していることだ」と言っている。しかしながら、この矛盾は、不変の人間性の原理に基づいているように思われる》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 The all-wise Author of Nature has, in this manner, taught man to respect the sentiments and judgments of his brethren; to be more or less pleased when they approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of it. He has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind; and has, in this respect, as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him his vicegerent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren. — Ibid . 《全知全能の創造主は、このようにして人間に、同胞の感情や判断を尊重するように、同胞が自分の行為を認めるときは多かれ少なかれ喜ぶように、否定するときは多かれ少なかれ傷...

Some splenetic philosophers, in judging of human nature, have done as peevish individuals are apt to do in judging of the conduct of one another, and have imputed to the love of praise, or to what they call vanity, every action which ought to be ascribed to that of praise-worthiness. I shall hereafter have occasion to give an account of some of their systems, and – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《意地の悪い哲学者の中には、人間の本性を判断する際に、不機嫌な個人がお互いの行為を判断する際にしがちなように、称讃に値することを愛する所為（せい）でなされたはずのあらゆる行為を、称讃を愛する心や所謂（いわゆる）虚栄心の所為（せい）にしている者もいる。これから先、彼らの体系の幾つかについて説明する機会もあるだろうから、今は立ち止まって検討することはしない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 Very few men can be satisfied with their own private consciousness that they have attained those qualities, or performed those actions, which they admire and think praise-worthy in other people; unless it is, at the same time, generally acknowledged that they possess the one, or have performed the other; or, in other words, unless they have actually obtained t...

But though he wished to find himself in the right, he wished likewise to gain his law-suit; and therefore he bribed the judges. If praise were of no consequence to us, but as a proof of our own praiseworthiness, we never should endeavour to obtain it by unfair means. But, though to wise men it is, at least in doubtful cases, of principal consequence upon this account; it is likewise of some consequence upon its own account: and therefore (we cannot, indeed, upon such occasions, call them wise men, but) men very much above the common level have sometimes attempted both to obtain praise, and to avoid blame, by very unfair means. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《しかし、彼は、自分が正しいことを知りたかったけれども、同時に訴訟に勝ちたいとも思ったので、裁判官に賄賂を贈った。称賛が、自分が称賛に値することを証明する以外、自分にとって何ら重要でないとすれば、不正な手段で称賛を得ようとするはずもない。しかし、このような訳で、賢者にとって、それは、少なくとも疑わしい場合は重要重大であるけれども、同時に称賛自体のためにも多少重要であるから、（このような場合は、賢者とは呼べないが）、一般的水準よりずっと上の人は、時として甚だ不正な手段を用い、称賛を得ようとも、非難を避けようともしてきたのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 Prais...

In France, Despreaux and Racine did not think it below them to set themselves at the head of a literary cabal, in order to depress the reputation, first of Quinault and Perreault, and afterwards of Fontenelle and La Motte, and even to treat the good La Fontaine with a species of most disrespectful kindness. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《フランスでは、デブレオーとラシーヌが、最初キノーとペローの評判を、後にフォントネルとラ・モットの評判を落とすために、自分たちを文学同人集団の先頭に立たせ、善良なラ・フォンテーヌを慇懃（いんぎん）無礼に扱うことさえも自分たちに相応（ふさわ）しくないとは思わなかった》 ― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 In England, the amiable Mr Addison did not think it unworthy of his gentle and modest character to set himself at the head of a little cabal of the same kind, in order to keep down the rising reputation of Mr Pope. Mr Fontenelle, in writing the lives and characters of the members of the academy of sciences, a society of mathematicians and natural philosophers, has frequent opportunities of celebrating the amiable simplicity of their manners; a quality which, ...

The great work of Sir Isaac Newton, his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, I have been told, was for several years neglected by the public. The tranquillity of that great man, it is probable, never suffered, upon that account, the interruption of a single quarter of an hour. Natural philosophers, in their independency upon the public opinion, approach nearly to mathematicians, and, in their judgments concerning the merit of their own discoveries and observations, enjoy some degree of the same security and tranquillity. The morals of those different classes of men of letters are, perhaps, sometimes somewhat affected by this very great difference in their situation with regard to the public. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《アイザック・ニュートン卿（きょう）の大著『自然哲学の数学的原理』は、数年にわたり世間から顧みられることが無かったと聞いている。それゆえ、この偉大な人物の平穏が、たった４分の１時間の間でさえ、妨害されるようなことは決してなかったであろう。自然哲学者は、世論に左右されないという点で、ほとんど数学者に近く、自らの発見や観察の功績に関する大衆の意見においては、ある程度同じ安心と平穏を享受しているのである。 　このような異なる階層の文人たちの...

He is at all times, however, liable to be most severely mortified by the unfavourable judgments of the public. Racine was so disgusted by the indifferent success of his Phaedra, the finest tragedy, perhaps, that is extant in any language, that, though in the vigour of his life, and at the height of his abilities, he resolved to write no more for the stage. That great poet used frequently to tell his son, that the most paltry and impertinent criticism had always given him more pain, than the highest and justest eulogy had ever given him pleasure. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《しかしながら、彼は常に、大衆の否定的な意見によってこの上なく悔しがりがちである。ラシーヌは、恐らくどの言語においても、現存する最高の悲劇『フェードラ』が、中位の成功だったことに嫌気が差して、人生の盛り、能力の絶頂にあったにもかかわらず、もう演劇のためには書くまいと決めた。その偉大な詩人はよく息子に、最も好意的で公正な賛辞に喜ぶよりも、最もつまらない、生意気な批評に、いつも苦しんできたと語ったものだった》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 The extreme sensibility of Voltaire to the slightest censure of the same kind is well known to every body. The Dunciad of Mr Pope is an everlasting mo...

A man of sensibility may sometimes feel great uneasiness lest he should have yielded too much even to what may be called an honourable passion; to his just indignation, perhaps, at the injury which may have been done either to himself or to his friend. He is anxiously afraid lest, meaning only to act with spirit, and to do justice, he may, from the too great vehemence of his emotion, have done a real injury to some other person; who, though not innocent, may not have been altogether so guilty as he at first apprehended. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《感受性の豊かな人は、自分や友人のどちらかに為（な）されたかもしれない危害に対する真っ当な憤り、言うならば名誉の感情にさえ負け過ぎてはしまわないかと大きな不安に駆られることがあるかもしれない。ただ奮然（ふんぜん）と行動し、正義を為そうとしたつもりが、その感情の激しさのあまり、無実ではないにせよ、最初に彼が感知したほどには罪深くはなかったかもしれない他人に実害を与えてしまわないかと心配し恐れるのである》 ― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 The opinion of other people becomes, in this case, of the utmost importance to him. Their approbation is the most healing balsam; their disapprobation, the bitterest and most to...

Nature, in this case, has rendered the pain, not only more pungent than the opposite and correspondent pleasure, but she has rendered it so in a much greater than the ordinary degree. A denial rids a man at once of the foolish and ridiculous pleasure; but it will not always rid him of the pain. When he refuses the merit which is ascribed to him, nobody doubts his veracity. It may be doubted when he denies the crime which he is accused of. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《この場合、造物主は、苦しみを、その反対に相当する楽しみよりもただ刺激的にしただけではなく、通常よりも遥かに大きな程度でそうしたのだった。否定すれば、愚かで滑稽な楽しみはすぐに取り除けるが、苦しみは取り除けるとは限らない。彼のものとされた功績を拒んでも、誰も彼の誠実さを疑いはしない。疑われるかもしれないのは、着せられた罪を否定したときである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He is at once enraged at the falsehood of the imputation, and mortified to find that any credit should be given to it. He feels that his character is not sufficient to protect him. He feels that his brethren, far from looking upon him in that light in which he anxiously desires to be viewed...

Pain, I have already had occasion to observe, is, in almost all cases, a more pungent sensation than the opposite and correspondent pleasure. The one, almost always, depresses us much more below the ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of our happiness, than the other ever raises us above it. A man of sensibility is apt to be more humiliated by just censure than he is ever elevated by just applause. Unmerited applause a wise man rejects with contempt upon all occasions; but he often feels very severely the injustice of unmerited censure. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《ほとんどすべての場合において、苦しみが、その反対に相当する喜びよりも刺激的な感覚であることは、既に述べた。前者〔＝苦しみ〕は、ほとんど常に、後者〔＝喜び〕が、普段の幸福、言うならば私達の自然状態の幸福を高める以上に、ずっと落ち込ませる。感受性の豊かな人は、ただ称賛されて高揚する以上に、ただ非難されて屈辱を感じるものだ。不相応の称賛は、賢明な人間なら、すべての場面で軽蔑し受け入れないが、不相応な非難は、しばしば酷く不当に感じるのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 By suffering himself to be applauded for what he has not performed, by assuming a merit which does not belong to him, he feels th...

To persons in such unfortunate circumstances, that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation. Every thing that could render either life or death respectable is taken from them. They are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them, that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of another world; a world of more candour, humanity, and justice, than the present; where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue to be finally rewarded: and the same great principle which can alone strike terror into triumphant vice, affords the only effectual consolation to disgraced and insulted innocence. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《このような不幸な境遇に置かれた人々にとって、考察が現世に限られた粗末な哲学は、恐らくほとんど慰めにはならないだろう。生か死のいず...

The agony of his mind may, in this case, frequently be greater than that of those who suffer for the like crimes, of which they have been actually guilty. Profligate criminals, such as common thieves and highwaymen, have frequently little sense of the baseness of their own conduct, and consequently no remorse. Without troubling themselves about the justice or injustice of the punishment, they have always been accustomed to look upon the gibbet as a lot very likely to fall to them. When it does fall to them, therefore, they consider themselves only as not quite so lucky as some of their companions, and submit to their fortune, without any other uneasiness than what may arise from the fear of death; a fear which, even by such worthless wretches, we frequently see, can be so easily, and so very completely conquered. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《この場合、彼の心の苦しみは、実際に犯したのと同様の罪で苦しむ人々よりも大きいことが多いかもしれない。こそ泥（どろ）や追剥（おいはぎ）のような放蕩（ほうとう）な犯罪者は、自分の行いの卑しさをほとんど自覚していないことが...

They are the most frivolous and superficial of mankind only who can be much delighted with that praise which they themselves know to be altogether unmerited. Unmerited reproach, however, is frequently capable of mortifying very severely even men of more than ordinary constancy. Men of the most ordinary constancy, indeed, easily learn to despise those foolish tales which are so frequently circulated in society, and which, from their own absurdity and falsehood, never fail to die away in the course of a few weeks, or of a few days. But an innocent man, though of more than ordinary constancy, is often, not only shocked, but most severely mortified by the serious, though false, imputation of a crime; especially when that imputation happens unfortunately to be supported by some circumstances which give it an air of probability. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《自分がまったく値しないと分かっている称賛を大いに喜べるのは、この上なく軽薄皮相な人間だけである。しかしながら、不当な非難は、人並み以上に志操堅固な人間さえも、しばしば怒り心頭に発させる。成程（なる...

These natural pangs of an affrighted conscience are the daemons, the avenging furies, which, in this life, haunt the guilty, which allow them neither quiet nor repose, which often drive them to despair and distraction, from which no assurance of secrecy can protect them, from which no principles of irreligion can entirely deliver them, and from which nothing can free them but the vilest and most abject of all states, a complete insensibility to honour and infamy, to vice and virtue. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《このような生来の恐怖に戦（おのの）く良心の呵責は、現世において罪人に付き纏（まと）い、静寂も安息も与えず、しばしば絶望と乱心へと追いやり、どんな秘密の保証も彼らを守れず、どんな無宗教の原理も彼らを完全に解放できず、名誉や不名誉、悪徳や美徳に対する完全な無感覚という、すべての状態の中で最も価値のない、見捨てられたもの以外、彼らを解放するものは何もない守護神なのである》 ― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 Men of the most detestable characters, who, in the execution of the most dreadful crimes, had taken their measures so coolly as to avoid even the suspicion of guilt, have sometimes been driven, by the horror of their situation, to d...

When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he finds that he can enter into none of the motives which influenced it. He is abashed and confounded at the thoughts of it, and necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to, if his actions should ever come to be generally known. His imagination, in this case too, anticipates the contempt and derision from which nothing saves him but the ignorance of those he lives with. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《自分がしたことを振り返り、公平な観察者がそれを視るであろう見方で視ると、彼はそれに影響を与えた動機のうち、何１つ共感できないことに気付く。そう思って、愕然とし、困惑し、万一自分の行為が一般に知られるようになれば、必然的に、自分が晒（さら）されることになるであろう恥辱の感度が非常に高くなる。この場合にも、彼は頭の中で、共に暮らす人々がそのことを知らないことしか彼を救うものはない軽蔑と嘲笑を予期するのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He still feels that he is the natural object of these sentiments, and still trembles at the thought of what he would suffer, if they were ever actually exerted against him. But if what he ha...

To desire, or even to accept of praise, where no praise is due, can be the effect only of the most contemptible vanity. To desire it where it is really due, is to desire no more than that a most essential act of justice should be done to us. The love of just fame, of true glory, even for its own sake, and independent of any advantage which he can derive from it, is not unworthy even of a wise man. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《称賛されるべきでない場合に、称賛を欲することや称賛を受け入れることさえも、最も卑しい虚栄心の成せる業（わざ）でしか有り得ない。本当に称賛されるべき場合に、称賛を欲することは、最も本質的な正義の行為が自分に対してなされることを欲することに過ぎないのである。正義の名声、真の栄光を愛することは、たとえそれ自体のためであっても、そこから得られる利益とは何ら無関係でも、賢者にとっても相応（ふさわ）しくないわけではない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He sometimes, however, neglects, and even despises it; and he is never more apt to do so than when he has the most perfect assurance of the perfect propriety of every part of his own conduct. His self-approbation, in this case, stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation of other men. I...

Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《造物主は、社会のために人間を形づくる際、同胞を喜ばせたいという欲求と、怒らせたくないという嫌悪をはじめに人間に授（さず）けた。 同胞が好意的に見ると喜びを感じ、否定的に見ると苦しみを感じるようにした。同胞が是認するのを、それ自体が彼にとって最も喜ばしく、心地よいものとし、同胞が是認しないのを、最も腹立たしく、不快なものとしたのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 But this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in oth...

The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour. When he views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it. He looks back upon every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better informed. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3.1.2. Chap. II 《経験上、一般的に好ましいとされる行動基準を厳守してきたと自覚している人は、自分の行動が適切であったことを満足げに振り返る。公平な観察者が視る観点で視るとき、彼はそれに影響を与えたすべての動機を徹底的に考察する。彼はそのあらゆる部分を、喜びと称賛をもって振り返る。人間は自分のしてきたことを決して知るはずはないのだろうけれども、彼は自分自身を、人々が実際に彼を見る見方によってではなく、もっと情報に通じていたら彼を見るであろう見方によって見るのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第 3 部：第２章 He anticipates the ap...

But their vanity arises from so gross an illusion of the imagination, that it is difficult to conceive how any rational creature should be imposed upon by it. When they place themselves in the situation of those whom they fancy they have deceived, they are struck with the highest admiration for their own persons. They look upon themselves, not in that light in which, they know, they ought to appear to their companions, but in that in which they believe their companions actually look upon them. Their superficial weakness and trivial folly hinder them from ever turning their eyes inwards, or from seeing themselves in that despicable point of view in which their own consciences must tell them that they would appear to every body, if the real truth should ever come to be known. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the lo...

The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness. It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us. If we are conscious that we do not deserve to be so favourably thought of, and that if the truth were known, we should be regarded with very different sentiments, our satisfaction is far from being complete. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 3. Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty Consisting of One Section ： 3.1.2. Chap. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 《どんなに心からの賞賛であっても、それが賞賛に値するものであることの何某（なにがし）かの証拠だと見做（みな）せなければ、ほとんど喜びを与えられない。無知や思い違いによって、何らかの方法で、尊敬され、称賛されても決して満足はしない。自分はこれほど好評価されるに値しない、本当のことが分かれば、まったく違った感情で評価されるはずだと自覚しているとすれば、私達の満足は完全なものとは程遠くなる》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』第...