名著探究

After all this, however, the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer. Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally concerned. That imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but momentary. The thought of their own safety, the thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what is felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches to the same degree of violence. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. IV The same subject continued 《しかしながら、こうしたことにもかかわらず、見物人の感情は、苦しんでいる人によって感じられるものの激しさには到底及ばないだろう。人間は、

Though you despise that picture, or that poem, or even that system of philosophy, which I admire, there is little danger of our quarrelling upon that account. Neither of us can reasonably be much interested about them. They ought all of them to be matters of great indifference to us both; so that, though our opinions may be opposite, our affections may still be very nearly the same. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. IV The same subject continued 《たとえ自分が賞賛している絵や詩、あるいは哲学体系さえも相手が嫌ったとしても、その所為（せい）で２人が喧嘩になる危険性は殆どない。２人とも、当然それらにさほど興味があるはずもない。それらはすべて、２人にとってまったく無関心な事のはずで、たとえ２人の意見が正反対であっても、２人の感情は殆ど変わらないだろう》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 4 章 同じ問題の続き But it is quite otherwise with regard to those objects by which either you or I are particularly affected. Though your judgments in matters of speculation, though your sentiments in matt

The utility of those qualities, it may be thought, is what first recommends them to us; and, no doubt, the consideration of this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value. Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality: and it is evident we attribute those qualities to it for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with our own.  Taste, in the same manner, is originally approved of, not as useful, but as just, as delicate, and as precisely suited to its object. The idea of the utility of all qualities of this kind, is plainly an after-thought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： Chap. IV The same subject continued 《そのような性質が最初に好ましく思われるのは、性質が役に立つからだと考えることも出来るだろうし、恐らく、このように考えることによって、その性質に関心

When the sentiments of our companion coincide with our own in things of this kind, which are obvious and easy, and in which, perhaps, we never found a single person who differed from us, though we, no doubt, must approve of them, yet he seems to deserve no praise or admiration on account of them. But when they not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when in forming them he appears to have attended to many things which we had overlooked, and to have adjusted them to all the various circumstances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but wonder and are surprised at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and comprehensiveness, and he appears to deserve a very high degree of admiration and applause. For approbation heightened by wonder and surprise, constitutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, and of which applause is the natural expression. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.3. Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own. 《ある人のあらゆる能力が、他人の同様の能力を判断する尺度となる。私は、あなたの視覚を私の視覚で、あなたの耳を私の耳で、あなたの理性を私の理性で、あなたの憤りを私の憤りで、あなたの愛を私の愛で判断する。私には、それらについて、他の如何なる判断方法もなければ、有り得もしない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第３章 他人の愛情が自分の愛情に合うか合わないかで、その妥当性や不適切性を判断する方法について。 We may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person by their correspondence or disagreement with

Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the relation which they stand in to the cause which excites them. In common life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and of the sentiments which directed it, we constantly consider them under both these aspects. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.3. Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own. 《哲学者たちは近年、専（もっぱ）ら情動の性質について考察するばかりで、情動を引き起こす動機との関係には、ほとんど注意を払ってこなかった。しかしながら、一般の生活において、誰の行為であれ、それを判断し、それを方向付けた感情を判断するときは、絶えずこの両面から考察するのである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第３章 他人の愛情が自分の愛情に合うか合わないかで、その妥当性や不適切性を判断する方法について。 When we blame in another man the excesses of love, of grief, of resentment, we not onl

The same thing often happens with regard to all the other passions. A stranger passes by us in the street with all the marks of the deepest affliction; and we are immediately told that he has just received the news of the death of his father. It is impossible that, in this case, we should not approve of his grief. Yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on our part, that, so far from entering into the violence of his sorrow, we should scarce conceive the first movements of concern upon his account. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.3. Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own. 《他のすべての感情に関しても、同じことがよく起こる。この上なく深い苦悩の面持ちをした見知らぬ人が道ですれ違い、父親の訃報に接したばかりだと言う。このような場合、彼の悲しみを認めないわけにはいかない。けれども、こちらに慈悲心が欠けてはいなくても、彼の悲しみの激しさを汲み取れず、彼のために心配しようにも、まずどうすればよいのか

To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them. If the same arguments which convince you convince me likewise, I necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily disapprove of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I should do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.3. Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own. 《他人の意見を承認することは、その意見を採用することであり、その意見を採用することは、その

The man who resents the injuries that have been done to me, and observes that I resent them precisely as he does, necessarily approves of my resentment. The man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonableness of my sorrow. He who admires the same poem, or the same picture, and admires them exactly as I do, must surely allow the justness of my admiration. He who laughs at the same joke, and laughs along with me, cannot well deny the propriety of my laughter. On the contrary, the person who, upon these different occasions, either feels no such emotion as that which I feel, or feels none that bears any proportion to mine, cannot avoid disapproving my sentiments on account of their dissonance with his own. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.3. Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of

If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness.  It gives us the spleen, on the other hand, to see another too happy or too much elevated, as we call it, with any little piece of good fortune. We are disobliged even with his joy; and, because we cannot go along with it, call it levity and folly.  We are even put out of humour if our companion laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it deserves; that is, than we feel that we ourselves could laugh at it. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.2. Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 《たとえ人が自分の不幸を声高に嘆き悲しんでいるのを耳にしても、そのことを自分に置き換えて考えてみると、自分にはそのような激しい影響はないと感じれば、その人の嘆きに衝撃は受けても、汲み取れはしないので、それを意

Love is an agreeable; resentment, a disagreeable passion; and accordingly we are not half so anxious that our friends should adopt our friendships, as that they should enter into our resentments. We can forgive them though they seem to be little affected with the favours which we may have received, but lose all patience if they seem indifferent about the injuries which may have been done to us: nor are we half so angry with them for not entering into our gratitude, as for not sympathizing with our resentment. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ：1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections：1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety：1.1.2. Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 《愛情は同意できる、恨みは同意できない感情である。それゆえに、友人たちが私達の敵意を汲み取ることの半分も、友情を育むことを気に掛けてはいない。彼らが、私達が受けた恩恵にほとんど影響されないように思われても許せるが、私達になされたかもしれない被害に対し無関心に思われたら耐えられない。また、私達の感謝の気持ちを汲み取らなくても、私達の憤（いきどお） りに共感しないことの半分も腹を立てることはない》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 2 章 相互共感の喜びについて

It is to be observed accordingly, that we are still more anxious to communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our agreeable passions, that we derive still more satisfaction from their sympathy with the former than from that with the latter, and that we are still more shocked by the want of it. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.2. Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 《それゆえに、何としても友人に愉快な感情よりも不愉快な感情の方を伝えたがり、後者（楽しい感情）への共感よりも、前者（不愉快な感情）への共感から得られる満足感の方が大きく、共感が得られなければびっくりするといったことが観られるであろう》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 2 章 相互共感の喜びについて How are the unfortunate relieved when they have found out a person to whom they can communicate the cause of their sorrow? Upon his sympathy they seem to disburthen themselves of a part of their distress: he is not improperly said to share it with them. He not only feels a sorrow of the

Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other, no doubt, do in some measure. When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him, but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves, and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus enlivens our own. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1

But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary. Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account, according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.2. Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 《しかし、共感の原因が何であろうと、共感がどのように引き起こされようと、私達自身の胸の内すべての感情に対する仲間意識を他人に観ること以上に嬉しいことはないし、これとは反対に見えることほど衝撃を受けることもない。利己心を少しばかり純化することによって、私達のすべての感情を演繹（えんえき）したがる人々は、この喜びも、この苦しみも、自分自身の原理に従って説明することに何も困らないと思っている》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 2 章 相互共感の喜びについて Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of th

That our sympathy can afford them no consolation seems to be an addition to their calamity; and to think that all we can do is unavailing, and that, what alleviates all other distress, the regret, the love, and the lamentations of their friends, can yield no comfort to them, serves only to exasperate our sense of their misery. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.1. Chap. I Of Sympathy 《私達が共感しても死者にとって何の慰（なぐさ）めにもならないことは、死者の災難に輪を掛けているように思われるし、私達に出来ることはすべて役に立たず、他のすべての苦痛を和らげるもの、死者の友人たちの悔恨、慈悲、悲嘆も、死者には何の慰めにもならないと考えたとて、死者の不幸に対する私達の気持ちは悪化するだけである》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 1 章 同感について The happiness of the dead, however, most assuredly, is affected by none of these circumstances; nor is it the thought of these things which can ever disturb the profound security of their repose. The idea of that dreary and endless melancholy, which t

Of all the calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind, the loss of reason appears, to those who have the least spark of humanity, by far the most dreadful, and they behold that last stage of human wretchedness with deeper commiseration than any other. But the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer. The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgment. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.1. Chap. I Of Sympathy 《死の必然性という条件が人類に齎（もたら）すすべての災難の中

If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence upon us. The effects of grief and joy terminate in the person who feels those emotions, of which the expressions do not, like those of resentment, suggest to us the idea of any other person for whom we are concerned, and whose interests are opposite to his. The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it, but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Acti

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.1. Chap. I Of Sympathy 《同情とは、他人の悲しみへの仲間意識を表すのに充（あ）てられた言葉である。共感は、意味はおそらく元々同じだっただろうが、今では如何なる感情に対する仲間意識を示すために使われようと、余り不適切ではないだろう》― アダム・スミス『道徳感情論』：第 1 部 ３つの部分から構成される行為の妥当性について：第 1 編 行為の適宜性について：第 1 章 同感について Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the

The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. The very force of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of. Men of the most robust make, observe that in looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own, which proceeds from the same reason; that organ being in the strongest man more delicate, than any other part of the body is in the weakest. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.1. Chap. I Of Sympathy 《あのような不幸な人達の惨（みじ）めさを目の当たりにして抱く恐怖は、他のどの部分よりも自分たちの特定の部分に強く作

It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of P

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. – Adam Smith, The Theory of moral sentiments ： 1. Part 1 Of the Propriety of Action Consisting of Three Sections ： 1.1. Section I Of the Sense of Propriety ： 1.1.1.

アダム・スミスの倫理体系における中心概念に、「公平な観察者」（impartial spectator）というものがある。 The impartial spectator is an imagined ‘man within the breast’ whose approbation or disapproval makes up our awareness of the nature of our own conduct. Smith is concerned to give an explanation of the voice of conscience, without departing totally from the sentimentalist and naturalistic tradition of Scottish moral philosophy. Conscience is not a mysterious or inexplicable force, since ‘the jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether on the desire of praise-worthiness and in the aversion to blame-worthiness’ which underlies our ‘dread of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people’ (Theory of the Moral Sentiments, iii. 2. 33). -- Oxford Reference （公平な観察者とは、想像上の「胸中の人物」であり、この人物が賛同するか非難するかによって、自分の行為の性質が分かる。スミスは、スコットランド道徳哲学の感情主義と自然主義の伝統から完全に逸脱することはなく、良心の声について説明しようと努めている。良心は、「内なる人間の権限は、賞賛に値する欲求と、非難に値する嫌悪に全く基づいている」のであるから、神秘的な力でもなければ、不可解な力でもない。その欲求の根底にあるのは、「私達が他人の